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Go to Editorial ManagerThe paper presents a novel approach that merges the abilities of the biological environment with the concept of hierarchical trees to attack a specific stream cipher. The model being presented introduces a systematic method that targets a group of stream ciphers, such as the GCM family, these devices are composed of components that are suitable for the proposed method. A restricted set of binaries for the final key sequence is required to implement this technique as an input. The attacked algorithm comprises feedback shift registers, memories, delays, and so on. The stream ciphers are widely used in modern encryption to secure communication devices, so any attempt to analyze or attack it is of the utmost importance. The results of this method have been confirmed to lead to the destruction of the cipher’s security. Many novelties and contributions of the present work can be summarized as follows: firstly, the key generator’s components are attacked individually, disrupting the cohesion between them. This was not possible previously except in rare cases and under difficult conditions. Secondly, the method of verifying the correct initial values is unrelated to the generator’s operation. Thirdly, the technique applies biological concepts and processes to laboratory test tubes for genetic engineering, it can be said that the prepared model targets a broad class of stream key generators, rather than a single algorithm. The proposed technique requires a specific and deterministic number of final key sequence bits, which are easy to provide. The proposed technique creates a search E -tree in the style of hierarchical clusters, in which the first level containsE nodes. Then each successive level contains the square of E nodes of the number of nodes in the previous level, and the root is composed of the total solution space of the stream key generator and produces the nodes of each level from the intersection of the cluster contents in the test tubes for all clusters in the level above it. The contribution and novelty of the present work is cryptanalyzing and attacking shift register-based stream key generators involves fragmentation. The attacking principle entails disassembling generator components from registers and individually attacking them. DNA logic clustering aids in this process, as the strength of these generators relies on component cohesion. Because the components are cryptanalyzed individually, the time complexity of the attack is equal to O(C2N) , where N is the length of the largest component, and C is a constant.
Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine a powerful algorithm of cryptography that can continue cryptanalyzing and attacking without the use of unconventional techniques. Although some of the substitution algorithms are old, such as Vigen`ere, Alberti, and Trithemius ciphers, they are considered powerful and cannot be broken. In this paper we produce the novelty algorithm, by using of biological computation as an unconventional search tool combined with an uninhibited analysis method is the vertical probabilistic model, that makes attacking and analyzing these ciphers possible and very easy to transform the problem from a complex to a linear one, which is a novelty achievement. The letters of the encoded message are processed in the form of segments of equal length, to report the available hardware components. Each letter codon represents a region of the memory strand, and the letters calculated for it are symbolized within the probabilistic model so that each pair has a triple encoding: the first is given as a memory strand encoding and the others are its complement in the sticker encoding; These encodings differ from one region to another. The solution space is calculated and then the parallel search process begins. Some memory complexities are excluded even though they are within the solution paths formed, because the natural language does not contain its sequences. The precision of the solution and the time consuming of access to it depend on the length of the processed text, and the precision of the solution is often inversely proportional to the speed of access to it. As an average of the time spent to reach the solution, a text with a length of 200 cipher characters needs approximately 15 minutes to give 98% of the correct components of the specific hardware. The aim of the paper is to transform OTP substitution analysis from a NP problem to a O(nm) problem, which makes it easier to find solutions to it easily with the available capabilities and to develop methods that are harnessed to attack difficult and powerful ciphers that differ in class and type from the OTP polyalphabetic substitution ciphers.