Abstract
The paper presents a novel approach that merges the abilities of the biological environment with the concept of
hierarchical trees to attack a specific stream cipher. The model being presented introduces a systematic method that
targets a group of stream ciphers, such as the GCM family, these devices are composed of components that are suitable
for the proposed method. A restricted set of binaries for the final key sequence is required to implement this technique
as an input. The attacked algorithm comprises feedback shift registers, memories, delays, and so on. The stream
ciphers are widely used in modern encryption to secure communication devices, so any attempt to analyze or attack it
is of the utmost importance. The results of this method have been confirmed to lead to the destruction of the cipher’s
security. Many novelties and contributions of the present work can be summarized as follows: firstly, the key generator’s
components are attacked individually, disrupting the cohesion between them. This was not possible previously except
in rare cases and under difficult conditions. Secondly, the method of verifying the correct initial values is unrelated
to the generator’s operation. Thirdly, the technique applies biological concepts and processes to laboratory test tubes
for genetic engineering, it can be said that the prepared model targets a broad class of stream key generators, rather
than a single algorithm. The proposed technique requires a specific and deterministic number of final key sequence
bits, which are easy to provide. The proposed technique creates a search E -tree in the style of hierarchical clusters,
in which the first level containsE nodes. Then each successive level contains the square of E nodes of the number of
nodes in the previous level, and the root is composed of the total solution space of the stream key generator and produces
the nodes of each level from the intersection of the cluster contents in the test tubes for all clusters in the level above
it. The contribution and novelty of the present work is cryptanalyzing and attacking shift register-based stream key
generators involves fragmentation. The attacking principle entails disassembling generator components from registers
and individually attacking them. DNA logic clustering aids in this process, as the strength of these generators relies on
component cohesion. Because the components are cryptanalyzed individually, the time complexity of the attack is equal
to O(C2N) , where N is the length of the largest component, and C is a constant.