Page 84 - 2023-Vol19-Issue2

80 | Hamed & Yassin

TABLE I.
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELATED WORKS.

Term Meaning Time needed
The time allotted to the crypto hash function. 0.0023 ms
Th The processing time for the XOR operation. Negligible
T? The processing time for a symmetric encryption function. 0.0046 ms
TE nc The processing time for the Concatenation operation. Negligible
T||

TABLE II.
COMPARING OF THE COMPUTATIONAL COST.

Scheme Registration Phase Login and Authentication Phases Total Cost
Wu et al. [21]
Taher et al. [22] 8Th + 3T? + 7TII 35Th + 11T? + 30TII + 1TDec + 1TEnc 43Th + 14T? + 37TII + 1TDec + 1TEnc ˜ 0.1081
Yassin et al. [23] 10Th + 10T? + 9TII 21Th + 32T? + 19TII 31Th + 42T? + 28TII ˜ 0.0713
Chatterjee et al. [24]
Our Scheme 5Th + 2T? + 1TII 13Th + 12T? + 6TII + 2TDec + 2TEnc 18Th + 14T? + 7TII + 2TDec + 2TEnc ˜ 0.0598
6Th + 3T? + 15TII 2TDec + 2TEnc + 22Th + 5T? + 88TII 28Th + 8T? + 103TII + 2TDec + 2TEnc ˜ 0.0828

2Th 8Th + 4TEnc + 3TDec + 6T? 10Th + 4TEnc + 3TDec + 6T? ˜ 0.0552

TABLE III. TABLE IV.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELATED WORKS. COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELATED WORKS.

Security Features [16] [17] [18] [19] Our Scheme Authors No of bits No of messages
Chatterjee et al. [24] 1280 2
Mutual Authentication YES YES NO YES YES Xiong et al. [19] 1120 3
Tahe et al. [26] 1660 3
Anonymous & Untraceable YES YES YES YES YES Wu et al. [21] 1600 3
Our Scheme 736 3
Forward Secrecy YES YES NO YES YES

Key Agreement NO NO NO NO YES

key management NO NO NO NO YES

MITM Attack YES NO NO NO YES

Replay Attack YES YES YES NO YES

Eavesdropping Attack NO NO NO NO YES

Unlinkability YES NO NO NO YES

EHR Migration phase NO NO NO NO YES

Insider attacks YES NO YES NO YES and security are of the utmost importance inside these sys-
tems. It is commonly accepted that concerns around safety
According to the above-mentioned comparisons, the sug- and secrecy pose substantial challenges to the functioning of
gested system has a lower time complexity (10Th + 4TEnc + the healthcare system. We offer a safe user authentication ap-
3TDec + 6T? ˜ 0.0552) than those in previous relevant stud- proach for patients in the healthcare system that uses Scyther,
ies. We can see that the proposed system has a fair mix of a formal security tool, to validate the proposed scheme’s se-
performance and security aspects (see Table III). curity. Our proposed approach clearly ensures ease, speed,
and integrity. Our technique ensures safe data storage and
B. Communication Cost approved information flow to defined sites. To ensure strong
The cost of transmitted messages is assessed during the login security while maintaining appropriate speed, the proposed
and authentication process. We assumed the identity size is 32 scheme employs a lightweight crypto hash function for the
bits, the hash value size is 160 bits [25], the cipher text value generation of OTPs and DGK . The major purpose of this
size is 128 bits, and the cipher text value size is homomorphic research is to provide a trustworthy authentication technique
32 bits. Table IV compares our proposed approach with those based on cryptosystem tools to solve the issues highlighted
in previous relevant research. in the previous studies. The suggested system will be able
to defend against attacks such as MITM, insider, and replay
VI. CONCLUSIONS attacks, among others. It is safe to employ features such as
mutual authentication, anomalies, key management, and other
EHRs allow authorized health stakeholders to communicate secure features, and it strives to achieve a mix of speed and
organized medical data to enhance the quality of healthcare security.
delivery. Since the patient’s situation may become exceed-
ingly perilous if personal information becomes public, privacy